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Abstract
The Rabin public-key cryptosystem is revisited with a focus on the problem of identifying
the encrypted message unambiguously for any pair of primes. In particular, a deterministic
scheme using quartic reciprocity is described that works for primes congruent 5 modulo 8,
a case that was still open. Both theoretical and practical solutions are presented. The Rabin
signature is also reconsidered and a deterministic padding mechanism is proposed.
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1 Introduction
In 1979, Michael Rabin [22] suggested a variant of RSA with public-key exponent 2, which he
showed to be as secure as factoring. The encryption of a message m ∈ Z∗N is C = m2 mod N ,
where N = pq is a product of two prime numbers, and decryption is performed by solving the
equation
x2 = C mod N , (1)
which has four roots; thus for complete decryption, further information is needed to identify
m among these roots. More precisely, for a fully automatic (deterministic) decryption we need
at least two more bits (computed at the encryption stage) to identify m without ambiguity. The
advantages of using this exponent 2, compared to larger exponents, are: i) a smaller computational
burden, and ii) solving (1) is equivalent to factoring N . The disadvantages are: iii) computation,
at the encryption stage, of the information required to identify the right root, and the delivery of
this information to the decryption stage, and iv) vulnerability to chosen-plain text attack [4, 19,
24, 15]. Several naive choice methods base selection of the correct root on the message semantics,
that is they retain the root that corresponds to a message that looks most meaningful, or the root
that contains a known string of bits. However, these methods are either unusable, for example
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when the message is a secret key, or are only probabilistic; in any case they affect the equivalence
between breaking the Rabin scheme and factoring [4]. Nevertheless, for schemes using pairs of
primes congruent 3modulo 4 (Blum primes), Williams [27] proposed a root identification scheme
based on the computation of a Jacobi symbol, using an additional parameter in the public key, and
two additional bits in the encrypted message.
The Rabin cryptosystem may also be used to create a signature by exploiting the inverse
mapping: in order to signm, the equation x2 = m mod N is solved and any of the four roots, say
S, can be used to form the signed message (m,S). However, if x2 = m mod N has no solution,
the signature cannot be directly generated; to overcome this issue, a random pad U is used until
x2 = mU mod N is solvable, and the signature is the triple (m,U, S) [21]. A verifier compares
S2 with mU mod N and accepts the signature as valid when these two numbers are equal. For
an application to electronic signature, an in-depth analysis on advantages/disadvantages can be
found in [3].
The next Section provides preliminary results concerning the solutions of the equation (1)
and the mathematics that will be needed. Section 3 describes in detail the Rabin scheme in the
standard setting, where both prime factors of N are congruent 3 modulo 4, and proposes a new
identification rule exploiting the Dedekind sums. Section 4 addresses the identification problem
for any pair of primes, featuring a deterministic scheme working with primes congruent 5 mod-
ulo 8 based on quartic residues of Gaussian integers. Section 5 considers a Rabin signature with
deterministic padding. Lastly, Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
LetN = pq be a product of two odd primes p and q. Using the generalized Euclidean algorithm to
compute the greatest common divisor between p and q, two integer numbers, λ1, λ2 ∈ Z, such that
λ1p+ λ2q = 1, are efficiently computed. Thus, setting ψ1 = λ2q and ψ2 = λ1p, so that ψ1 + ψ2 = 1,
it is easily verified that ψ1 and ψ2 satisfy the relations

ψ1ψ2 = 0 mod N
ψ21 = ψ1 mod N
ψ22 = ψ2 mod N .
(2)
and that ψ1 = 1 mod p, ψ1 = 0 mod q, and ψ2 = 0 mod p, ψ2 = 1 mod q. According to the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT), using ψ1 and ψ2, every element a in ZN can be represented as
a = a1ψ1 + a2ψ2 mod N ,
where a1 ∈ Zp and a2 ∈ Zq are calculated as a1 = a mod p , a2 = a mod q.
The four roots x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ ZN of (1), represented as positive numbers, are obtained using
the CRT from the roots u1, u2 ∈ Zp and v1, v2 ∈ Zq of the two equations u2 = C mod p and
v2 = C mod q, respectively. The roots u1 and u2 = p− u1 are of different parities; likewise, v1 and
v2 = q−v1. If p is congruent 3modulo 4, the root u1 can be computed in deterministic polynomial-
time as ±C p+14 mod p; the same holds for q. If p is congruent 1 modulo 4, an equally simple
algorithm is not known; however, u1 can be computed in probabilistic polynomial-time using
Tonelli’s algorithm [2, 19] once a quadratic non-residue modulo p is known (this computation is
the probabilistic part of the algorithm), or using the (probabilistic) Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm
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[5, 9, 26] to factor the polynomial u2−C modulo p. Using the previous notations, the four roots of
(1) can be written as 

x1 = u1ψ1 + v1ψ2 mod N
x2 = u1ψ1 + v2ψ2 mod N
x3 = u2ψ1 + v1ψ2 mod N
x4 = u2ψ1 + v2ψ2 mod N .
(3)
Lemma 1 LetN = pq be a product of two prime numbers. LetC be a quadratic residue moduloN ; the four
roots x1, x2, x3, x4 of the polynomial x
2−C are partitioned into two sets X1 = {x1, x4} andX2 = {x2, x3}
such that roots in the same set have different parities, i.e. x1 = 1 + x4 mod 2 and x2 = 1 + x3 mod 2.
Furthermore, assuming that u1 and v1 in equation (3) have the same parity, the residues modulo p and
modulo q of each root in X1 have the same parity, while each root in X2 has residues of different parities.
PROOF. Since u1 and v1 have the same parity by assumption, then also u2 and v2 have the same
parity. The connection between x1 and x4 is shown by the following chain of equalities
x4 = u2ψ1 + v2ψ2 = (p− u1)ψ1 + (q − v1)ψ2 = −x1 mod N = N − x1 ,
because pψ1 = 0 mod N and qψ2 = 0 mod N , and x1 is less than N by assumption, thus −x1 mod
N = N−x1 is positive and less thanN . A similar chain connects x2 and x3 = N−x2; the conclusion
follows because N is odd and thus x1 and x4 as well as x2 and x3 have different parities.

2.1 The Mapping R : x→ x2
The mappingR : x→ x2 is four-to-one and partitions Z∗N into disjoint subsets u of four elements
specified by equation (3). Let U be the group of the four square roots of unity, that is the roots of
x2 − 1 consisting of the four-tuple
U = {1, a,−a,−1} .
Obviously, U is a group of order 4 and exponent 2. Each subset u, consisting of the four square
roots of a given quadratic residue, may be described as a cosetmU of U, i.e.
u = mU = {m,am,−am,−m} .
The number of these cosets is φ(N)4 , and they form a group which is isomorphic to a subgroup of
Z∗N of order φ(N)/4. Once a coset u = {x1, x2, x3, x4} is given, a problem is to identify the four
elements contained in it.
By Lemma 1 each xi is identified by the pair of bits
bp = (xi mod p) mod 2, and bq = (xi mod q) mod 2 .
In summary, the table
root bp bq
x1 u1 mod 2 v1 mod 2
x2 u1 mod 2 v2 mod 2
x3 u2 mod 2 v1 mod 2
x4 u2 mod 2 v2 mod 2
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shows that two bits identify the four roots. On the other hand, the expression of these two bits
involves the prime factorization of N , that is p and q, but when the factors of N are not available,
it is no longer possible to compute these parity bits, and the problem is to find which parameters
can be used, and the minimum number of additional bits required to be disclosed in order to label
a given root among the four.
Adopting the convention introduced along with equation (3), a parity bit, namely b0
.
= xi mod 2
distinguishes x1 from x4, and x2 from x3, therefore it may be one of the parameters to be used in
identifying the four roots. It remains to determine how to distinguish between roots having the
same parity, without knowing the factors of N .
2.2 Dedekind sums
ADedekind sum is denoted by s(h, k) and defined as follows [23]. Let h, k be relatively prime and
k ≥ 1, then we set
s(h, k) =
k∑
j=1
((
hj
k
))((
j
k
))
(4)
where the symbol ((x)), defined as
((x)) =
{
x− ⌊x⌋ − 12 if x is not an integer
0 if x is an integer ,
(5)
denotes the well-known sawtooth function of period 1. The Dedekind sum satisfies the following
properties, see [6, 13, 23] for proofs and details:
1) h1 = h2 mod k⇒ s(h1, k) = s(h2, k)
2) s(−h, k) = −s(h, k)
3) s(h, k) + s(k, h) = −14 + 112
(
h
k
+ 1
hk
+ k
h
)
, a property known as the reciprocity theorem for
Dedekind sums.
4) 12ks(h, k) = k + 1 − 2
(
h
k
)
mod 8 for k odd, a property connecting Dedekind sums and
Jacobi symbols.
The first three properties allow us to compute a Dedekind sum by a method that mimics the
Euclidean algorithm and has the same efficiency. In the sequel we need the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 If k = 1 mod 4, then, for any h relatively prime with k, the denominator of s(h, k) is odd.
PROOF. In the definition of s(h, k) we can limit the summation to k − 1 because
((
k
k
))
= 0,
furthermore, from the identity ((−x)) = −((x)) it follows that ∑k−1j=1
((
hj
k
))
= 0 for every
integer h [23], then we may write
s(h, k) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
j
k
− 1
2
)(
hj
k
−
⌊
hj
k
⌋
− 1
2
)
=
k−1∑
j=1
j
k
(
hj
k
−
⌊
hj
k
⌋
− 1
2
)
,
4
since
((
hj
k
))
is never 0, because j < k and h is relatively prime with k by hypothesis. The last
summation can be split into the sum of two further summations, such that
- the first summation
k−1∑
j=1
j
k
(
hj
k
−
⌊
hj
k
⌋)
has the denominator patently odd;
- the second summation is evaluated as −1
2
k−1∑
j=1
j
k
= −k − 1
4
.
In conclusion, the denominator of s(h, k) is odd because s(h, k) is the sum of a fraction with
odd denominator with −k−14 , which is an integer number by hypothesis.

3 Rabin scheme: primes p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4
As was said in the introduction, an important issue in using the Rabin scheme is the choice of the
right root at the decrypting stage. If p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4, a solution to the identification problem
has been proposed by Williams [27] and is reported below, slightly modified from [21], along with
three different solutions.
3.1 Williams’ scheme
Williams [21, 27] proposed an implementation of the Rabin cryptosystem, using a parity bit and
the Jacobi symbol.
The decryption process is based on the observation that, setting D = 12 (
(p−1)(q−1)
4 + 1), if
b = a2 mod N and
(
a
N
)
= 1, we have bD = a
(
a
p
)
= a
(
a
q
)
, given that
a
ϕ(N)
4 = (aψ1 + aψ2)
ϕ(N)
4 = a
ϕ(N)
4 ψ1 + a
ϕ(N)
4 ψ2 =
(
a
p
)
ψ1 +
(
a
q
)
ψ2 =
(
a
p
)
=
(
a
q
)
,
as a
p−1
2 =
(
a
p
)
mod p, a
q−1
2 =
(
a
q
)
mod q, and p−12 and
q−1
2 are odd (cf. also Lemma 1 in [27]).
Public-key: [N,S], where S is an integer such that
(
S
N
)
= −1.
Encrypted message [C, c1, c2], where
c1 =
1
2
[
1−
(
m
N
)]
, m¯ = Sc1m mod N , c2 = m¯ mod 2 , and C = m¯
2 mod N .
Decryption stage :
compute m′ = CD mod N and N − m′, and choose the number, m′′ say, with the parity
specified by c2. The original message is recovered as
m = S−c1m′′ .
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3.2 A second scheme: Variant I
A simpler variant exploiting the Jacobi symbol is the following:
Public-key: [N ].
Encrypted message [C, b0, b1], where
C = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2 and b1 =
1
2
[
1 +
(
m
N
)]
.
Decryption stage :
- compute, as in (3), the four roots, written as positive numbers,
- take the two roots having the same parity specified by b0, say z1 and z2,
- compute the numbers
1
2
[
1 +
(
z1
N
)]
1
2
[
1 +
(
z2
N
)]
and take the root corresponding to the number equal to b1.
Remark 1. The two additional bits are sufficient to uniquely identify m among the four roots,
because, as previously observed, the roots have the same parity in pairs, and within each of these
pairs the roots have opposite Jacobi symbols modulo N . In fact, roots with the same parity are of
the form a1ψ1 + a2ψ2 and a1ψ1 − a2ψ2 (or −a1ψ1 + a2ψ2), whence the conclusion follows from
(
a
N
)
=
(
a1ψ1 + a2ψ2
pq
)
=
(
a1ψ1 + a2ψ2
p
)(
a1ψ1 + a2ψ2
q
)
=
(
a1
p
)(
a2
q
)
(6)
and the fact that −1 is a nonresidue modulo a Blum prime.
3.3 A second scheme: Variant II
There is a second variant exploiting the Jacobi symbolwhich, at some extra computational cost and
further information in the public key, requires the delivery of no further bit, since the information
needed to decrypt it is carried by the encrypted message itself [10]. Let ξ be an integer such that(
ξ
p
)
= −
(
ξ
q
)
= 1, for example ξ = α2ψ1 − ψ2 mod N , with α ∈ Z∗N . The detailed process
consists of the following steps
Public-key: [N, ξ].
Encrypted message [C], where C is obtained as follows
C ′ = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2 , b1 =
1
2
[
1−
(
m
N
)]
and C = C ′(−1)b1ξb0 mod N .
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Decryption stage :
- compute d0 =
1
2
[
1−
(
C
q
)]
, and set C” = Cξ−d0
- compute d1 =
1
2
[
1−
(
C
N
)]
, and set C ′ = C”(−1)d1
- compute, as in (3), the four roots of C ′, written as positive numbers,
- take the root identified by d0 and d1
Remark 2. Note that the Jacobi symbol
(
C
N
)
discloses the message parity to an eavesdropper.
3.4 A scheme based on Dedekind sums
Letm ∈ ZN be the message to be encrypted, with N = pq, p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4. The detailed process
consists of the following steps:
Public-key: [N ].
Encrypted message [C, b0, b1], where
C = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2 , and b1 = s(m,N) mod 2 ,
in which, due to Lemma 2, the Dedekind sum can be taken modulo 2 since the denominator
is odd.
Decryption stage :
- compute, as in (3), the four roots, written as positive numbers,
- take the two roots having the same parity specified by b0, say z1 and z2,
- compute the numbers
s(z1, N) mod 2 s(z2, N) mod 2 ,
and take the root corresponding to the number equal to b1.
The algorithm works because s(z1, N) mod 2 6= s(z2, N) mod 2 by the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 If k is the product of two Blum primes p and q, (x1, k) = 1, and x2 = x1(ψ1 − ψ2), then
s(x1, k) + s(x2, k) = 1 mod 2 .
PROOF.
By property 4), which compares the value of the Dedekind sum with the value of the Jacobi sym-
bol, we have
12Ns(x1, N) = N + 1− 2
(
x1
N
)
mod 8 and 12Ns(x2, N) = N + 1− 2
(
x2
N
)
mod 8;
summing the two expressions (member by member) and taking into account thatN = 1 mod 4we
have
12N(s(x1, N) + s(x2, N)) = 2N + 2− 2
[(
x1
N
)
+
(
x2
N
)]
mod 8 ,
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since 12N = 4 mod 8, 2N = 2 mod 8. Now, we showed above that the sum of the two Jacobi
symbols is 0; then, applying Lemma 2, we have
4(s(x1, N) + s(x2, N)) = 4 mod 8 ⇒ s(x1, N) + s(x2, N) = 1 mod 2 ,
which concludes the proof.

4 Root identification for any pair of primes
If p and q are not both Blum primes, identification of m among the four roots of the equation
x2 − C , where C = m2 mod N , can be given by the pair [b0, b1] where
b0 = xi mod 2 and b1 = (xi mod p) + (xi mod q) mod 2 ,
as a consequence of Lemma 1. The bit b0 can be computed at the encryption stagewithout knowing
p nor q, while b1 requires, in this definition, p and q to be known, and cannot be directly computed
knowing only N .
In principle, a way to obtain b1 is to publish a pre-computed binary list (or table) that has, in
position i, the bit b1 pertaining to the message m = i. This list does not disclose any useful
information on the factorization of N because, even if we know that the residues modulo p and
modulo q have the same parity, we do not know which parity, and if these residues have different
parities we do not know which is which. Although the list makes the task theoretically feasible,
its size is of exponential complexity with respect to N , and thus practically unrealizable.
While searching for different ways of obtaining b1, or some other identifying information, several
approaches have been investigated:
• to define a polynomial function that assumes the values in the above-mentioned list at the
corresponding integer positions; unfortunately this solution is not practical, because this
polynomial has a degree roughly equal toN , and is not sparse; it is thus more complex than
the list.
• to extend the method of the previous section, based on quadratic residues, to any pair of
primes, by using power residues of higher order and more general reciprocity laws; in par-
ticular the quartic reciprocity with Gaussian integers will be involved in providing a neat
solution for primes congruent to 5modulo 8.
• to exploit group isomorphisms; this could also be of practical interest, although not optimal,
in that it relies on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm problem and it may require more
bits than the theoretical lower bound of 2 to be communicated.
4.1 Polynomial function
We may construct an identifying polynomial as an interpolation polynomial, choosing a prime P
greater than N . Actually the polynomial
L(x) =
N−1∑
j=1
((j mod p) + (j mod q) mod 2) (1− (x− j)P−1)
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assumes the value 1 in 0 < m < N , if the residues of m modulo p and modulo q have different
parities, and assumes the value 0 elsewhere. Unfortunately, as said, the complexity of L(x) is
prohibitive and makes this function useless in practical terms.
4.2 Residuosity
In Section 3, the Jacobi symbol, i.e. the quadratic residuosity, was used to distinguish the roots
in the Rabin cryptosystem, when p = q = 3 mod 4. For primes congruent 1 modulo 4, Legendre
symbols cannot distinguish numbers of opposite sign, therefore quadratic residuosity is no longer
sufficient to identify the roots. Higher power residue symbols could in principle do the desired job,
but unfortunately their use is not straightforward and analogous reciprocity laws ormultiplicative
properties are not always at hand.
Actually, higher power residues have been used in some generalizations of the Rabin scheme
working in residue rings modulo non-prime ideals of algebraic number fields. For instance,
residue rings in Eisenstein or Gauss fields were considered in [25], and Rabin-like schemes based
on encryption rules involving powers of the message higher than 2 were introduced. This ap-
proach however does not address the problem of separating the roots of a quadratic equation in
the classic Rabin scheme.
Before presenting a neat solution of this root identification problem using quartic reciprocity
for primes congruent 5 modulo 8, we show below difficulties and attempts concerning a general
solution for non Blum primes.
Let 2k and 2h be the even exponents of Zp and Zq, respectively, that is 2
k strictly divides (p − 1)
and 2h strictly divides (q − 1), and assume that k ≥ h. Then the rational power residue symbols
x
p−1
2k mod p and x
q−1
2h mod q can distinguish, respectively, between u1 and u2 and between v1 and
v2. As we would like to use N as a modulo, an idea is to multiply the exponents and consider
the function x
φ(N)
2k+h mod N , which would identify m among the 2k+h 2k-th roots of unity in Z∗N .
The idea would be to make these roots publicly available and label them, so that the sender of the
message can tell which of them corresponds to the message actually sent. There are two problems:
first the exponent φ(N)
2k+h
should also be available, but necessarily in somemasked form via multipli-
cation by an odd number in order to hide the factors ofN ; but, most importantly among the public
2k-th roots of unity we would find the square roots, and in particular K
.
= ψ1 − ψ2. However, the
greatest common divisor ofK + 1 = 2ψ1 and N yields q, and so N would be factored.
Let us now look a bit deeper in this direction, trying to refine this idea. The multiplicative
group Z∗N , direct product of two cyclic groups Cp−1 and Cq−1, can also be viewed as the direct
product of two abelian subgroups, namely a 2-group and a group of odd order, that is
Z∗N = (C2k × C2h)×
(
C2fp+1 × C2fq+1
)
.
Therefore, every element a of Z∗N can be written as a product a2ao where ao is an element of odd
order, and a2 is an element of order a power of 2, i.e. it is an element of a 2-group which has rank
2 and exponent 2k.
The four roots V4 = {1,−1, ψ,−ψ} of 1, where ψ = ψ1 − ψ2 mod N , form a group of order 4
(the Vierergruppe) of rank 2, and generators −1 and ψ. Let a be a quadratic residue, then its
four square roots {A,A1, A2, A3} may be written as {A,−A,Aψ,−Aψ}, where we choose now to
consider remainders modulo N of absolute value less than N/2.
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• • • •
Figure 1: Tree representation of the 2-group of order 2× 2 in Z∗7·19
A specific square rootm of a among {A,−A,Aψ,−Aψ} is identified by the sign ofm and a further
number c, possibly a single bit, which should be computed with the constraint of usingN ,m, and
some additional public information that should not disclose the factors p and q ofN . Leaving, for
a moment, this last constraint, we show how to compute c using a sort of residuosity of convenient
order depending on the group C2k × C2h .
Let 2fN +1 = lcm{2fp+1, 2fq +1} be the maximum order of the elements in the subgroup of odd
order, therefore a2fN+1o = 1 mod N . Since 2fN + 1 and 2
k are relatively prime, then a generalized
Euclidean algorithm gives α and β such that α(2fN + 1) + β2
k = 1, then we have
mα(2fN+1) = (m2mo)
α(2fN+1) = m
α(2fN+1)
2 m
α(2fN+1)
o = m
α(2fN+1)
2 = m
1−β2k
2 = m2 .
Therefore, an exponentiation with exponent α(2fN +1) defines an homomorphism θ of the group
Z∗N onto the subgroup G2 = C2k×C2h , such that four-tupleswb of square roots of the same element
b in Z∗N are mapped into four-tuples gθ(b) of square roots of the same element θ(b) in G2. Therefore,
in order to identify any specified four-tuple of roots, it is sufficient to consider its image in G42 .
Then, it is useful to consider the partition of G2 into 4-tuples that are cosets of the groupV4 of the
square roots of 1.
The situation is pictorially described using a 4-ary rooted tree T with nodes labeled by the ele-
ments of the 2-group G2. The four nodes at the first layer below the root are labeled by the four
roots of unity. At this layer, the node labeled with 1 is a terminal node, the remaining three nodes
may or may not be terminal nodes depending on the form of the primes p and q. The height of the
tree is k(≥ h); the number of nodes at each level is a multiple of 4, and depends on the forms of
the primes p and q. If there is a path (a sequence of branches) connecting a node u with a node v
of a superior layer, we say that v is above u.
For the sake of example, Figures 1, 2, and 3 show every possible shape of trees with at most two
layers. In particular, the tree in Figure 1 corresponds to a pair of primes congruent 3modulo 4, the
tree in Figure 2 corresponds to a pair of primes, one congruent 3 modulo 4 and the second con-
gruent 5modulo 8, lastly, the tree in Figure 3 corresponds to a pair of primes congruent 5modulo
8.
Note that every set of four nodes, directly connected to the same node, can be identified by a sin-
gle label, say the coset leader, since the set of labels of these nodes can be seen as a coset of V4.
The next two lemmas show how to use the tree to identify the correct root of X2 = b mod N , but,
unfortunately, also show that the residuosity connected with θ(.) discloses the factorization of N .
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Figure 2: Tree representation of the 2-group of order 22 × 2 in Z∗5·7
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Figure 3: Tree representation of the 2-group of order 22 × 22 in Z∗5·13
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Lemma 4 Assume that the exponent α(2fN + 1) is public together with a table T of 2
h+k−2 elements,
containing one of the two positive elements for each set of 4 elements of the group G2 as described in its tree
representation. Then, only two bits are sufficient to identify a square rootm of b, that is, one bit for the sign
ofm, and one bit telling whether |θ(m)|, the absolute value of θ(m), can be found in the table or not.
PROOF When the sender wants to encrypt m, then the triple {b, b0, b1} is sent, where b = m2 mod
N , b0 is the sign ofm, and b1 = I(|θ(m)| ∈ T ), with I being the indicator function.
Given [b, b0, b1] and knowing the factorization ofN = pq, the right valuem is identified as follows:
1. Solve the equation x2 = b mod N and find four values [A,−A,B,−B]
2. Compute [|θ(A)|, |θ(B)|], one of these two values is in the table, therefore select the one
compatible with b1.
3. Define the correct valuem using the previous value and b0.

Unfortunately, the disclosure of α(2fN + 1) leads to factor N .
Lemma 5 Assuming that α(2fN + 1) is known, then the probability of factoring N is not less than 1/2.
PROOF We already showed that knowing ψ we can factor N . Picking an integer xr at random, the
probability that u = x
α(2fN+1)
r is below ψ or −ψ in the tree is at least 1/2. In the favorable event
that u is below ψ or −ψ, a power of uwith a convenient exponent 2f(u) gives ψ. The probability is
exactly 1/2 in the case of Blum primes, otherwise is larger as can be deduced from the trees.

In conclusion, the scheme allows us in principle to compute two bits discriminating the four roots
of b, by means of functions computable using only m, N and not its factorization. Unfortunately,
the additional information made public, the table and the exponent, permit the factorization of
N deterministically, as one can retrieve ψ from the table, as well as probabilistically with high
probability, as a consequence of Lemma 5.
Therefore, it is necessary to look at different kinds of higher order residuosity which should allow
• a definition of symbols a la Jacobi specifying the residue character;
• a reciprocity law for these symbols;
• the values of the symbols should belong to a finite group which does not reveal any infor-
mation allowing the factorization ofN .
Let ℓ denote the height of the tree T, and ζ2ℓ be a primitive root of unity; it turns out that such
a 2ℓ-residuosity exists in the ring of integers Z[ζ2ℓ ] of cyclotomic fields Q(ζ2ℓ). Let ν ∈ Z[ζ2ℓ ] be
irreducible. A symbol of residuosity may be defined, [11, Theorem 46, p.211], as
[
b
ν
]
2ℓ
= b
N (ν)−1
2ℓ mod ν = ζ
γ(b)
2ℓ
, (7)
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where N (ν) is the norm of ν in Q(ζ2ℓ), γ(b) is an integer that certainly exists, since ζ2ℓ and b
N (ν)−1
2ℓ
are both roots ofX2
ℓ − 1 mod ν.
Using this residuosity, the difficulty is moved to compute γ(b), however, in case of quartic residu-
osity, the task is made possible by the Gauss-Jacobi’s quartic residue symbols and their reciprocity
law, as we show in the next subsection.
4.2.1 Identification scheme using quartic residuosity
Assuming that p and q are congruent 5modulo 8, we show here that the quartic residuosity in the
Gaussian integers is sufficient to discriminate the 4 square roots with exactly 2 bits.
LetZ[i] be the ring of Gaussian integers, which is Euclidean, so that the factorization is unique
except for a reordering and a multiplication by units. The units are U = {1,−1, i,−i} and form
a cyclic group [14]. Any integer z = x + iy in Z[i] has four associates, namely z,−z, iz, and −iz.
In Z[i] the rational primes p congruent 1 modulo 4 split as p = (a + ib)(a − ib), and 2 splits as
2 = (1 + i)(1 − i). The following notions and properties are taken from [16, p.119-127], which we
refer to for proofs and details.
Definition 1 An integer x+ iy of Z[i], is said to be primary if x+ iy = 1 mod (1 + i)3.
An integer z ∈ Z[i] is said to be odd if it is not divisible by 1 + i.
The norm of x+ iy ∈ Z[i] is N (x+ iy) = x2 + y2.
We note that any odd integer x+ iy has an associated primary which can be obtained upon mul-
tiplication by a unit. We now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1 An odd prime p congruent 5 modulo 8 has the representation, as a sum of two squares, of the
form p = (2X + 1)2 + 4(2Y + 1)2, then in Z[i] decomposes as
p = ((2X + 1) + 2(2Y + 1)i)((2X + 1)− 2(2Y + 1)i) ,
and a primary factor is
π = ((2X + 1) + 2(2Y + 1)i)(−1)X−1 .
PROOF Since p can be written as a sum of two squares p = (2X + 1)2 + 4y2, the first part of the
lemma is proved by showing that y is odd. Taking pmodulo 8we have
p mod 8 = 5 = 4X(X + 1) + 1 + 4y2 = 1 + 4y2 ⇒ 4y2 = 4 mod 8⇒ y2 = 1 mod 2 ,
which implies y = 1 mod 2.
The prime factor π of p in Z[i] is primary if it is congruent 1 modulo −2 + 2i. Imposing this
condition, with u a unit, and considering that 4 = 0 mod (−2 + 2i), we have
1 = ((2X + 1) + 2i(2Y + 1))u mod (−2 + 2i) = u(2X + 3) mod (−2 + 2i) ,
because 2i = 2 mod (−2 + 2i). We distinguish two cases:
1. If X is even then u must satisfy the condition 3u = 1 mod (−2 + 2i), which forces u = −1,
that is u = (−1)X−1.
13
2. If X is odd then umust satisfy the condition 5u = 1 mod (−2 + 2i), which forces u = 1, that
is u = (−1)X−1 again.
This concludes the proof.

Let π ∈ Z[i] be an odd irreducible, and π |/ α. There exists a unique integer j, [16, p.122], such that
α
N (π)−1
4 = ij mod π .
This property is used to define a quartic residue symbol as
[
α
π
]
4
=
{
ij if π |/ α
0 otherwise
.
Let ν = a+ ib be a primary odd number, then a Jacobi-like symbol for quartic residues, written as[
β
ν
]
4
and called Gauss-Jacobi symbol, is defined multiplicatively, similarly to the Jacobi symbol
in the quadratic case. It satisfies the following properties [16, 18] that allow us to evaluate the
symbol without knowing the factorization of the arguments:
1.
[
α+ µν
ν
]
4
=
[
α
ν
]
4
,
2.
[
αβ
ν
]
4
=
[
α
ν
]
4
[
β
ν
]
4
,
3.
[
i
ν
]
4
= i−
a−1
2 and thus
[ −1
ν
]
4
= (−1)a−12 ,
4.
[
1 + i
ν
]
4
= i
a−1−b−b2
4 and thus
[
2
ν
]
4
= i
−b
2 ,
5. If ω = c+ di is a primary odd number, its real part c is odd, then either c or −c is congruent
1 modulo 4, it follows that the real part of ω or −ω is congruent 1 modulo 4. Let α = u+ vi
and β = t+wi be odd with the real part congruent 1modulo 4, the reciprocity law takes the
Jacobi-Kaplan form [
α
β
]
4
[
β
α
]−1
4
= (−1) v·w4 .
The main theorem of this section permits to identify the four square roots of a quadratic residue
in Z[i] using only two bits and without unveiling the factorization of N or ν.
Proceeding as we previously did in the definition of ψ1 and ψ2, given π1, π2 relatively prime inte-
gers in Z[i], we can find ξ1, ξ2, such that ξ1+ξ2 = 1, ξ1 = µ2π2 and ξ2 = µ1π1 for some µ1, µ2 ∈ Z[i],
and set ξ = ξ1 − ξ2, which turns out to be a square root of 1modulo ν, i.e. ξ2 = 1 mod ν.
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Theorem 2 Let ν = π1π2 be the product of two primary primes having norms congruent 5 modulo 8. A
root α among the four square roots {γ,−γ, γξ,−γξ} of a quadratic residue β can be uniquely identified
with two bits b0 and b1 defined as:
b0 =
{
1 if ℜ(α) > 0
0 if ℜ(α) < 0 ,
(use ℑ(α) if ℜ(α) = 0);
b1 =


1 if
[
α
ν
]
4
∈ {1, i}
0 if
[
α
ν
]
4
∈ {−1,−i}
.
PROOF. With the given choice of b0, the parameter b1 must discriminate α from αξ or−αξ. Due to
the multiplicative property of the Gauss-Jacobi symbol, this is tantamount to show that
[
ξ
ν
]
4
=
[ −ξ
ν
]
4
= −1. Indeed we have
[
ξ
ν
]
4
=
[
ξ
π1
]
4
[
ξ
π2
]
4
=
[
ξ1 − ξ2
π1
]
4
[
ξ1 − ξ2
π2
]
4
=
[
ξ1
π1
]
4
[ −ξ2
π2
]
4
.
But ξ1 = 1− ξ2 and conversely ξ2 = 1− ξ1, so we obtain the expression
[
ξ
ν
]
4
=
[
1− ξ2
π1
]
4
[ −(1− ξ1)
π2
]
4
=
[
1
π1
]
4
[ −1
π2
]
4
= −1 .
This conclusion follows because, by Theorem 1, π2 is of the form ((2X +1)+ 2(2Y +1)i)(−1)X−1,
which implies [ −1
π2
]
4
= (−1) (2X+1)(−1)
X−1−1
2 = −1 ,
since the exponent is always odd, whatever be the parity of X.
In the same way
[ −ξ
ν
]
4
= −1 by exchanging the role of π1 and π2.
In summary,
[
α
ν
]
4
= −
[
αξ
ν
]
4
= −
[ −αξ
ν
]
4
, then b1 ∈ {0, 1} distinguishes among the two
roots with the same b0.

Remark 3. LetN be equal to the norm of ν, then a representation of the elements of the finite ring
Zν = Z[i]/νZ[i], which is isomorphic to ZN , may consist of the same elements of ZN . A more ”nat-
ural” representation of Zν consists of N elements of Z[i], which have minimum Euclidean norm
and are not congruent to one another modulo ν. The two representations are perfectly equiva-
lent, the use of one or the other only depends on the simplicity of computations and arithmetic
operations in Z[i]/νZ[i].
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LetN = pq be decomposed in Z[i] as a product νν¯, where ν = π1π2 is the product of an irreducible
factor of p and an irreducible factor of q. Noting that ν and ν¯ are relatively prime, any number f
of ZN is uniquely identified by the pair [f1, f2] obtained by taking the remainders modulo ν and
modulo ν¯, i.e. f1 = f mod ν, f2 = f mod ν¯, and f2 is easily seen to be the complex conjugate f¯1 of
f1. The value f is recovered from the pair [f1, f¯1], by using the Chinese remainder theorem
f = f1ζ1 + f¯1ζ2 mod N , (8)
where ζ1 = µ1ν¯ mod N and ζ2 = µ2ν mod N , are the complex counterpart of ψ1 and ψ2, with
µ1 and µ2 computed by means of the generalized Euclidean algorithm. It is pointed out, as a
consequence of equation (8), that a quadratic residue m modulo N is also a quadratic residue
modulo ν, and a square root A of m modulo N corresponds to a square root α of m modulo ν.
Therefore, −A corresponds to −α, Aψ corresponds to αξ, and −Aψ corresponds to −αξ because
ξ = ψ mod ν. This last identity is straightforwardly proved observing that
1 = ψ1 + ψ2 = λ2q + λ1p = λ2π2π¯2 + λ1π1π¯1
in Z[i], thus, taking the remainder modulo ν, we have
1 = (λ2π¯2)π2 + (λ1π¯1)π1 mod ν = ξ1 + ξ2 mod ν ,
due to the definition of ξ1 and ξ2, and finally ξ1 = ψ1 mod ν and ξ2 = ψ2 mod ν for the Chinese
remainder theorem.
A Rabin scheme working with primes p and q congruent 5 modulo 8 can be defined considering
the decomposition N = νν¯ with ν = π1π2 being the product of two primary factors of p and q
respectively.
Public-key: [ν].
Message: m.
Encrypted message [C, b0, b1], where
C = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2 , and b1 =


1 if
[
m
ν
]
4
∈ {1, i}
0 if
[
m
ν
]
4
∈ {−1,−i}
.
Decryption stage :
- compute, as in (3), the four roots of C modulo N , written as positive numbers,
- take the two roots having the same parity specified by b0, say z1 and z2,
- compute the quartic residues
[
z1
ν
]
4
[
z2
ν
]
4
,
and take the root corresponding to b1.
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Remark 4. The extension to residuosity of higher order is straightforward only up to Q(ζ32)
because these fields are Euclidean [17]. The next fieldQ(ζ64) has class number 17, thus is certainly
not Euclidean. Also, the Euclide algorithm may not always be easy to perform. It is known that
for Gaussian integers Z[i] the division may be performed by rounding the entries of the quotient
of integers v = v0+v1i
ν
= (a0; a1) ∈ Q2 to nearest integers, a′0 + a′1i = (⌊a0 + 12⌋; ⌊a1 + 12⌋) ∈ Z2. The
remainder of minimum norm is obtained as r0 + r1i = (v0 + v1i)− ν · (a0 + a1i).
It is also known that the 1-step norm-Euclidean algorithm for Z[ζ8] devised by Eisenstein [7] is
implicitly defined by rounding, and [20, Sec. 4.1] includes an explicit proof.
4.3 Group isomorphisms
In this section, we describe a practical method, working with any pair of primes, that can have ac-
ceptable complexity, although it requires a one-way function that might be weaker than factoring.
A possible solution is to use a function d defined from ZN into a group G of the same order,
and define a function d1 such that d1(x1) = d(x2). The public key consists of the two functions
d and d1. At the encryption stage, both are evaluated at the same argument, the message m,
and the minimum information necessary to distinguish their values is delivered together with the
encrypted message. The decryption operations are obvious. The true limitation of this scheme is
that d must be a one-way function, otherwise two square roots that allow us to factor N can be
recovered as in the residuosity subsection.
Following this approach, we propose the following solution, based on the hardness of com-
puting discrete logarithms.
Given N , let P = µN + 1 be a prime (the smallest prime), that certainly exists by Dirichlet’s
theorem [1], that is congruent 1moduloN . Let g be a primitive element generating the multiplica-
tive group Z∗P .
Define g1 = g
µ and g2 = g
µ(ψ1−ψ2), and as usual letm denote the message.
Public key: [N,P, g1, g2].
Encryption stage: [C, b0, d1, d2, p1, p2], whereC = m
2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2, p1 is a position in the
binary expansion of gm1 mod P , whose bit d1 is different from the bit in the corresponding
position of the binary expansion of gm2 mod P , and p2 is a position in the binary expansion of
gm1 mod P , whose bit d2 is different from the bit in the corresponding position of the binary
expansion of g−m2 mod P .
Decryption stage :
- compute, as in (3), the four roots, written as positive numbers,
- take the two roots having the same parity specified by b0, say z1 and z2,
- compute A = gz11 mod P and B = g
z2
1 mod P
- between z1 and z2, the root is selected that has the correct bits d1 and d2 in both the given
positions p1 and p2 of the binary expansion of A or B.
The algorithm is justified by the following Lemma.
Lemma 6 The power g0 = g
µ generates a group of order N in Z∗P , thus the correspondence x ↔ gx0
establishes an isomorphism between a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗P and the additive group of ZN . The
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four roots of x2 = C mod N , C = m2 mod N are in a one-to-one correspondence with the four powers
gm0 mod P , g
−m
0 mod P , g
m(ψ1−ψ2)
0 mod P and g
−m(ψ1−ψ2)
0 mod P .
PROOF. The first part is due to the choice of P : the group generated by g0 has order N , thus, the
isomorphism follows immediately. The second part is a consequence of Section 2.1.

The price to pay is the costly arithmetic inZP , and the equivalence of the security of the Rabin
cryptosystem with the hardness of factoring is now conditioned by the complexity of computing
the discrete logarithm in ZP .
5 The Rabin signature
In the introduction, we said that a Rabin signature of a message m may consist of a pair [n, S];
however, if x2 = m mod N has no solution, this signature cannot be directly generated. To
overcome this obstruction, a random pad U was proposed [21], and attempts are repeated un-
til x2 = mU mod N is solvable, and the signature is the triple (m,U, S), [21]. A verifier compares
mU mod N with S2 and accepts the signature as valid when these two numbers are equal.
This section presents a modified version of this scheme, where U is computed deterministi-
cally.
Now, the quadratic equation x2 = m mod N is solvable if and only ifm is a quadratic residue
modulo N , that is m is a quadratic residue modulo p and modulo q. When m is not a quadratic
residue, we show below how to exploit the Jacobi symbol to compute a suitable pad and obtain
quadratic residues modulo p and q. Let
f1 =
m1
2
[
1−
(
m1
p
)]
+
1
2
[
1 +
(
m1
p
)]
, f2 =
m2
2
[
1−
(
m2
q
)]
+
1
2
[
1 +
(
m2
q
)]
.
Writingm = m1ψ1 +m2ψ2, the equation
x2 = (m1ψ1 +m2ψ2)(f1ψ1 + f2ψ2) = m1f1ψ1 +m2f2ψ2
is always solvable moduloN , becausem1f1 andm2f2 are clearly quadratic residues modulo p and
modulo q, respectively, since
(
m1
p
)
=
(
f1
p
)
,
(
m2
q
)
=
(
f2
q
)
, so that
(
m1f1
p
)
=
(
m1
p
)(
f1
p
)
= 1 ,
(
m2f2
q
)
=
(
m2
q
)(
f2
q
)
= 1 .
Note that if p and q are Blum primes, it is possible to choose f1 =
(
m1
p
)
and f2 =
(
m2
q
)
.
Thus we can describe the following procedure:
Public-key: N
Signed message: [U,m,S], where U = R2 [f1ψ1 + f2ψ2] mod N is the padding factor, with R a
random number, and S is any solution of the equation x2 = mU mod N . R is needed to
avoid that knowing U allows to easily factor N .
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Verification: compute mU mod N and S2 mod N ; the signature is valid if and only if these two
numbers are equal.
This signature scheme has several interesting features:
1. the signature is possible using every pair of primes, and thus it could be used with the
modulo of any RSA public key, for example;
2. different signatures of the same document are different;
3. the verification needs only two multiplications, therefore it is fast enough to be used in au-
thentication protocols.
5.1 Forgery attacks
Schemes of this type are however vulnerable to forgery attacks: it is relatively easy to compute
S2 mod N , choose any message m′, compute U ′ = S2m′−1 mod N , and forge the signature as
(m′, U ′, s) without knowing the factorization of N . In some variants a hash H(m) is used instead
of m and S is a solution of x2 = H(mU) mod N , but this does not help against the above forgery
attack. The following variant aims at countering this vulnerability.
Public-key: N
Signed message: [m,UK2 mod N,SK3 mod N,K4 mod N ], where U is the padding factor, K a
random number, and S is any solution of the equation x2 = mU mod N .
Verification: compute (SK3)2 mod N and mUK2K4 mod N ; the signature is valid if and only if
these two numbers are equal.
We remark that U , K and S are not known. Forgery would be possible if K were known,
but to know K one has to solve an equation of degree at least 2. To verify the signature only two
multiplications and one square are needed.
Note that there is another signature scheme relying on the difficulty of finding square roots,
the Rabin-Williams signature (cf. [12]), which avoids the forgery vulnerability. While that scheme
requires the use of two primes respectively congruent to 3 and 7modulo 8, the two variants above
do not need this condition. Moreover in the Rabin-Williams scheme, a message cannot be signed
twice in two different ways, otherwise the factorization of N might get exposed. In the above
schemes, using a deterministic pad as above, allows different signatures of the same message.
For more on forgery and blindness on Rabin signatures, please refer also to [8].
6 Conclusions and Remarks
Let us make here a few comments on the Rabin schemes in general, after having mainly dwelled
on the deterministic aspects and identification problems.
In principle, the Rabin scheme is very efficient, because only one square is required for en-
cryption; furthermore, it is provably as secure as factoring. Nevertheless, it is well known [4, 15]
that it presents some drawbacks, mainly due to the four-to-one mapping, that may discourage its
use to conceal the content of a message, namely:
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• the root identification requires the delivery of additional information, which may increase
computational costs;
• many proposed root identification methods, based on the message semantics, have a proba-
bilistic character and cannot be used in some circumstances;
• the delivery of two bits together with the encrypted message exposes the process to active
attacks by maliciously modifying these bits. For example, suppose an attacker A sends an
encryptedmessage toB asking that the decryptedmessage be delivered to a third partyC (a
friend of A). If in the encrypted message the bit that identifies the root among the two roots
of the same parity had been deliberately changed, A can get a root from C that, combined
with the original message, enables the Rabin public-key to be factored. Even Variant II is not
immune to those kind of active attacks.
In conclusion, the Rabin scheme may suffer from some hindrance when used to conceal a
message, whereas it seems effective when applied to generate an electronic signature or as a hash
function. However, these observations do not exclude the practical use of the Rabin scheme (as is
actually profitably done in some standardized protocols), when other properties, like integrity and
authenticity, are to be taken care of, along with message secrecy, in a public-encryption protocol.
7 Acknowledgments
This work was partially done while the first author was Visiting Professor with the University
of Trento, funded by CIRM, and he would like to thank the Department of Mathematics for the
friendly and fruitful atmosphere offered. The third author has been supported by the Swiss Na-
tional Science Foundation under grant No. 132256. We would also like to thank Steven Galbraith
for his comments on a preliminary version of the paper and for pointing out some references.
References
[1] T.M. Apostol, Introduction to Analytic Number Theory, Springer, New York, 1976.
[2] E. Bach, J. Shallit, Algorithmic Number Theory, MIT, Cambridge Mass., 1996.
[3] D.J. Bernstein, Proving tight security for Rabin-Williams signatures, EUROCRYPT 2008 (N. P.
Smart, ed.), LNCS, vol. 4965, Springer, 2008, pp. 70–87.
[4] J.A. Buchmann, Introduction to Cryptography, Springer, New York, 1999.
[5] D.G. Cantor, H. Zassenhaus, A new Algorithm for Factoring Polynomials over Finite Fields,
Math. Comp., Vol. 36, N. 154, April 1981, pp.587-592.
[6] R. Dedekind, Schreiben an Herrn Borchardt, J. Reine Angew. Math., 83, 1877, pp.265-292.
[7] G. Eisenstein, U¨ber einige allgemeine Eigenschaften der Gleichung, vonwelcher die Theilung
der ganzen Lemniscate abha¨ngt, nebst Anwendungen derselben auf die Zahlentheorie, J.
Reine Angew. Math., 39 (1850), 224-274; 275-287.
20
[8] M. Elia, D. Schipani, On the Rabin signature, to appear in J. Discrete Math. Sci. Cryptogr..
[9] M. Elia, D. Schipani, Improvements on the Cantor-Zassenhaus Factorization Algorithm, to
appear inMath. Bohem.
[10] D.M. Freeman, O. Goldreich, E. Kiltz, A. Rosen, G. Segev, More Constructions of Lossy and
Correlation-Secure Trapdoor Functions, PKC 2010, Springer LNCS 6056 (2010), pp.279-295.
[11] A. Fro¨hlich, M.J. Taylor, Algebraic Number Theory, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994.
[12] S. Galbraith, The Mathematics of Public Key Cryptography, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012.
[13] E. Grosswald, Topics from the Theory of Numbers, Birkha¨user, Basel, 2009.
[14] G.H. Hardy, E.M. Wright, An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers, Oxford at the Clarendon
Press, 1971.
[15] J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, J.H. Silverman, An introduction to mathematical cryptography, Springer,
New York, 2008.
[16] K. Ireland, M. Rosen, A Classical Introduction to Modern Number Theory, Springer, New York,
1998.
[17] N. Kaiblinger, Cyclotomic rings with simple Euclidean algorithm, JP J. Algebra Number Theory
Appl., 23, no. 1, 2011, pp.6176.
[18] F. Lemmermeyer, Reciprocity Laws, Springer, New York, 2000.
[19] A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone,Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press,
Boca Raton, 1997.
[20] C. Monico, M. Elia, On the Representation of Primes in Q(
√
2) as Sums of Squares, JPANTA,
vol. 8, Issue 1, June 2007, p.121-133.
[21] J. Pieprzyk, T. Hardjono, J. Seberry, Fundamentals of Computer Security, Springer, New York,
2003.
[22] M. Rabin, Digitalized signature as intractable as factorization,
Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, January 1978.
[23] H. Rademacher, E. Grosswald, Dedekind Sums, MAA, New York, 1972.
[24] B. Schneier, Applied cryptography, Wiley, 1996.
[25] T. Takagi, S. Naito, Extension of Rabin Cryptosystem to Eisenstein and Gauss Fields, IEICE
Trans. Fundamentals, Vol. E80-A, No. 4, April 1997.
[26] J. von zur Gathen, J. Gerhard,Modern Computer Algebra, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.
[27] H.C. Williams, A modification of the RSA public-key encryption procedure, IEEE Trans. on
Inform. Th., IT-26(6), November 1980, pp.726-729.
21
